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A Standardless Standard  
HOW A MISAPPLICATION OF KELO ENABLED 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY TO BENEFIT FROM 
EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the New York Court of Appeals in Kaur v. New 
York State Urban Development Corp. granted Empire State 
Development Corporation (ESDC), a public authority, permission 
to take land in Manhattanville by eminent domain for sale to 
Columbia University, a private institution.1 The taking indirectly 
displaced thousands of vulnerable residents and failed to create 
meaningful public benefits.2 Though ESDC justified the taking as 
a means to eliminate urban blight,3 substantial evidence strongly 
indicated that its primary motivation was Columbia’s private 
benefit.4 By deferring to ESDC’s findings, the court misapplied 
important judicial principles and failed to prevent an 
unconstitutional exercise of eminent domain.  
The government’s power to take property for public use 
is both created and limited by the Public Use Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, which dictates that “private property [shall 
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”5 Since 
the founding of the United States, courts have interpreted the 
requirement that property only be taken to serve public 
purposes as a necessary restriction on the power of legislatures 
to seize land.6 By restricting the government’s authority to take 
private property only for public purposes, the clause imposes a 
safeguard against governmental favoritism and the abusive 
  
 1 Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010), 
cert. denied Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).  
 2 Brief of Amicus Curiae New York State Senator Bill Perkins at 19-20, 
Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 2010-1025), 
2010 WL 3952034, at *19-20 [hereinafter Perkins Amicus Brief]. 
 3 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 724. 
 4 See infra Part V. 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).  
 6 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798). 
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dispossession of property owners.7 Because takings often 
disproportionately harm vulnerable populations⎯such as the 
elderly and ethnic minorities⎯courts must ensure that such 
power is in fact used only to further the public good.8 Failing to 
do so in Kaur, the court approved an unconstitutional taking9 
with devastating effects on many Manhattanville residents.10 
The Supreme Court established the standard for public-
use review in Kelo v. City of New London. In Kelo, the Court 
upheld a taking where the City intended to transfer property to a 
private developer with the public purpose of encouraging 
economic development.11 In so holding, the Court explicitly 
established the government’s ability to take private property and 
subsequently convey such property to another private party so 
long as a predominantly public purpose is served.12 Nevertheless, 
the Kelo Court maintained the judiciary’s traditional 
responsibility to review whether a taking is actually intended to 
serve a public purpose rather than solely to provide a private 
benefit.13 The Court suggested the existence of a taking where the 
evidence of hidden impermissible favoritism is so substantial as to 
warrant a presumption of constitutional invalidity.14 Such a case 
requires heightened judicial scrutiny into whether the taking is 
actually intended to accomplish a public purpose rather than the 
traditional deference applied in Kelo.15  
This note argues that where affected landowners present 
sufficient evidence that the purported public purpose of a taking 
is merely pretextual to bestowing a private advantage, courts 
must consider all such evidence and deny absolute deference to 
the condemning authority.16 This way, courts can prevent 
governmental agencies from abusing their power of eminent 
domain to transfer property from vulnerable populations to 
private parties who enjoy governmental favoritism.17  
  
 7 See, e.g., Vill. Auto Body Work, Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Westbury, 454 N.Y.S.2d 
741, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).  
 8 See infra Part I. 
 9 See infra Part V. 
 10 See infra Part I. 
 11 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005). 
 12 See id.  
 13 Id. at 478. 
 14 See infra Part II. 
 15 See infra Part II. 
 16 See infra Part II. 
 17 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 505 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
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Since Kelo, courts have disagreed over whether the 
requirement of serious judicial inquiry into substantiated 
allegations of pretext extends to takings justified by blight 
remediation.18 While some courts correctly extend the Kelo 
analysis to any takings challenged with substantial evidence of 
impermissible favoritism,19 the Second Circuit explicitly rejected 
the application of heightened scrutiny in Goldstein v. Pataki, 
where a taking was intended to remediate blight because the 
court found that Kelo’s pretext analysis only applied to economic 
development takings.20 However, though findings of blight were 
traditionally limited to unsafe and unsanitary conditions,21 the 
modern definition of blight removal applied in New York is so 
broad that it encompasses the spirit of economic development 
addressed by the Court in Kelo.22 Therefore, the Second Circuit’s 
absolute deference to the condemning authority’s findings of 
blight in Goldstein failed to properly apply Kelo and invited 
future abuses of the eminent domain power.23  
This failing led the New York Court of Appeals in Kaur 
to review the exercise of eminent domain with absolute 
deference where ESDC claimed its actions were intended to 
eliminate blight.24 Substantial evidence indicated the taking 
was primarily intended to benefit Columbia: Columbia created 
blighting factors, ESDC assisted in manufacturing a blight 
study at Columbia’s behest, and ESDC sought to withhold 
important documents from the challengers during litigation, 
clearly indicating a conspiratorial relationship between ESDC 
and Columbia.25 Furthermore, the procedural protections for 
property owners seeking to bring public use challenges in New 
York are prone to abuse because the statutes governing eminent 
domain procedure do not allow trial-level review of such claims.26 
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the taking 
  
 18 See infra Part III. 
 19 Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 170-71 (D.C. 
2007) (finding impermissible favoritism where an agency gave taken land to a private 
party for the purpose of developing a purportedly blighted area); In re Condemnation 
Proceeding by the Redevelopment Auth. of Phila., 938 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. 2007) (citing 
Kennedy’s concurrence for the requirement to seriously review the record for 
impermissible favoritism).  
 20 Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 n.10 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 21 Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 330 (N.Y. 1975).  
 22 See infra Part IV.  
 23 See infra Part III.  
 24 See generally Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y.), 
cert. denied, Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).  
 25 See infra Part IV.  
 26 See N.Y. EM. DOM. LAW § 207 (Consol. 2011). 
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without even mentioning the heightened standard required by 
Kelo.27 By failing to apply heightened scrutiny, the court 
misapplied Kelo and enabled ESDC to abuse the power of 
eminent domain. Thus, the Supreme Court should have reversed 
the New York Court of Appeals and remanded Kaur for review 
using the heightened scrutiny required by Kelo. In denying the 
challengers’ petition for certiorari,28 the Court failed to defend 
the vulnerable populations who will be harmed by eminent 
domain abuse in Manhattanville29 and also missed an 
opportunity to clarify its misunderstood holding in Kelo.30 
This note will argue that the New York Court of 
Appeals applied an overly deferential standard of review to the 
taking at issue in Kaur and, in doing so, disobeyed the 
constitutional requirements of the Fifth Amendment under 
Kelo to the detriment of Manhattanville’s economically 
disadvantaged citizens. Part I will describe the harms imposed 
on vulnerable populations when courts permit eminent domain 
abuse. Part II will explain that Kelo requires a heightened 
standard of judicial review where challengers to a taking must 
present substantial evidence that a condemning authority’s 
stated public purpose is mere pretext for bestowing a private 
benefit. Part III will discuss the divergent standards of review 
applied by courts to public use challenges where takings are 
not solely justified by the need for economic development. Part 
IV will argue that courts in New York should apply heightened 
scrutiny to takings for blight remediation where challengers 
allege an unconstitutional private purpose because the factors 
in New York for determining whether an area is blighted and 
those for determining the need for economic development are 
indistinguishable from one another. Part V will argue that the 
New York Court of Appeals failed to prevent eminent domain 
abuse in Kaur. This part will argue that the court should have 
applied heightened scrutiny to ESDC’s motives because 
substantial factual evidence supported a finding of 
impermissible favoritism and because the procedures for 
challenging a taking under the Public Use Clause in New York 
are particularly prone to abuse. It will further suggest that, 
due to the failures of the New York judiciary to prevent 
eminent domain abuse, the state legislature should take action 
  
 27 See Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 737. 
 28 Tuck-It-Away, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 822-23.  
 29 See infra Part I. 
 30 See infra Part III. 
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to protect vulnerable parties from private takings with merely 
pretextual public benefits. Finally, this note concludes by 
suggesting further discussion. 
I. THE NEED FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF SUSPICIOUS 
TAKINGS TO PREVENT HARMFUL ABUSE 
The government’s power to take private property has 
the dangerous potential to harm vulnerable populations and 
thus must be restricted to its constitutional limitations. The 
Public Use Clause forbids the exercise of eminent domain for 
purely private transfers, which could otherwise 
unconstitutionally harm property owners who do not enjoy 
governmental favoritism.31 Without proper restraints on 
legislative power to take and transfer property, “[t]he specter of 
condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent 
the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any 
home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”32 Thus, 
eminent domain abuse results in legislatures favoring rich and 
powerful citizens over those with less means to promote their 
economic and political interests,33 just as the residents of 
Harlem were harmed in favor of Columbia University. 
Takings for economic development “disproportionately 
harm racial and ethnic minorities, the elderly, and the 
economically underprivileged.”34 This proposition, championed 
by Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo,35 is supported by 
substantial anecdotal evidence.36 As of 2007, eminent domain 
project areas nationally were composed of, on average, 58 
percent of minority residents while the surrounding 
  
 31 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (quoting id. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).  
 32 Id. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 33 See id. at 505. 
 34 Brief of Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, et. al. in Support of Petitioners at 3, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057, at *3 [hereinafter NAACP Amicus Brief]. 
 35 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 36 See NAACP Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 10 (“In San Jose, California, 
ninety-five percent of the properties targeted for economic redevelopment are Hispanic 
or Asian-owned, even though only thirty percent of businesses are owned by 
minorities . . . . In Ventnor, New Jersey, forty percent of the city’s Latino community 
lives in a zone targeted for economic redevelopment . . . . In Mt. Holly Township, New 
Jersey, officials have targeted for economic redevelopment a neighborhood in which the 
percentage of African-American residents (44%) is twice that of the entire Township 
and nearly triple that of Burlington County, and in which the percentage of Hispanic 
residents (22%) is more than double that of all of Mt. Holly Township, and more than 
five times that of the county.”). 
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communities contained an average of only 45 percent of 
minorities.37 Similarly, the median incomes of persons living 
within eminent domain project areas was $18,935.71, while the 
median income of persons in the surrounding communities was 
$23,113.46.38 Generally, properties are often selected for eminent 
domain partially due to their low market values, which dictates 
the amount of compensation the government is required to pay 
upon condemnation.39 Thus, displaced citizens typically face 
difficulties finding “adequate replacement housing.”40 This is 
particularly burdensome on the elderly, many of whom do not 
own their homes and are more likely to spend the end of their 
lives in nursing homes if displaced.41 Clearly, those harmed by 
takings for economic development and blight remediation are 
groups with relatively little political and economic power who 
are in the greatest need of protection by the courts.42 
The exercise of eminent domain in Manhattanville will 
primarily harm economically disadvantaged residents.43 In an 
amicus brief in support of the challengers in Kaur, New York 
State Senator Bill Perkins urged against the taking because 
the proposed development would indirectly displace between 
three thousand and five thousand Harlem residents.44 In 
particular, as the affected area was composed of 29.4 percent 
African-Americans and 52.3 percent Latinos, the taking would 
disproportionately burden minority citizens.45 Like the takings 
before it,46 the use of eminent domain in Manhattanville will 
invariably impose hardships on economically disadvantaged 
and politically impotent residents while further enriching a 
wealthy and powerful private actor, here Columbia University. 
Standing up to legislative abuse on behalf of powerless 
citizens is an essential function of the courts and should be 
embraced under the Public Use Clause.47 Justice Stone’s famous 
Footnote Four in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 
  
 37 DICK M. CARPENTER II & JOHN K. ROSS, INST. FOR JUSTICE, VICTIMIZING 
THE VULNERABLE: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/Office_Initiatives/Eminent_Domain/Demog
raphics%20of%20Eminent%20Domain%20Abuse.pdf.  
 38 Id. 
 39 NAACP Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 13.  
 40 Id.  
 41 Id. at 14.  
 42 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521-22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 43 Perkins Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 1. 
 44 Id. at 19. 
 45 Id. at 19-20. 
 46 CARPENTER II & ROSS, supra note 37, at 6.  
 47 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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established the need for heightened judicial scrutiny of 
legislative decisions when they harm “discrete and insular 
minorities.”48 Eminent domain abuse tends to cause such harm 
because it “eliminates (or severely undermines) established 
community support mechanisms and has a deleterious effect on 
those groups’ ability to exercise what little political power they 
may have established as a community.”49 Thus, takings that 
benefit private parties should not receive deferential treatment 
when challenged under the Public Use Clause because they 
“curtail the operations of those political processes ordinarily to 
be relied upon to protect minorities . . . .”50 For these reasons, 
courts should apply Kelo’s test for impermissible favoritism to 
takings where evidence suggests that a stated public purpose is 
mere pretext for the unconstitutional transfer of property to a 
private party.51 The New York Court of Appeals failed to do so 
in Kaur and thus unconstitutionally harmed the vulnerable 
residents of Manhattanville.52 
II. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON: SETTING THE STANDARD 
OF REVIEW  
The Supreme Court established the standard for 
reviewing challenges to eminent domain takings under the 
Public Use Clause in Kelo.53 Where substantial evidence shows 
a taking “is intended to favor a particular private party, with 
only incidental or pretextual public benefits,” the court must 
not defer to the condemning authority.54 Rather, the court must 
review the evidence to determine if the taking will result in 
actual benefits to the public.55 If such review reveals 
impermissible favoritism rather than a valid public use, then 
the taking is unconstitutional.56 In Kaur, the court misapplied 
this standard and, in doing so, ratified a flagrant violation of 
the Public Use Clause.57  
In Kelo, the New London Development Corporation 
(NLDC), a nonprofit entity authorized to assist the City of New 
  
 48 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 49 NAACP Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 15. 
 50 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 51 See infra Part II. 
 52 See infra Part V. 
 53 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).  
 54 See id. at 491-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. at 491.  
 57 See infra Part V.  
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London, sought to take private land for the purpose of 
promoting economic development.58 NLDC planned to give the 
land to the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer Inc. so they could build 
a $300 million research facility.59 The City projected the project 
would create over one thousand jobs, increase tax revenues, 
and generally improve the area’s economy.60 Susette Kelo, a 
homeowner whose property was at risk from the proposed 
project, filed a suit against the City for violating the Public Use 
Clause.61 Justice Stevens, writing for the five-justice majority, 
rejected the petitioner’s claim and held that private transfers of 
land taken through eminent domain are constitutional under 
the Public Use Clause where the purpose is to promote 
economic development.62 
Though the Court gave deference to the legislature’s 
determination that the public purpose of economic development 
would be served by the taking,63 Justice Stevens noted that the 
government may not “take property under the mere pretext of a 
public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a 
private benefit.”64 Such was not the case in Kelo, Stevens noted, 
because the taking was “executed pursuant to a ‘carefully 
considered’ development plan.”65 Thus, the Court left the door 
open for a hypothetical taking that might be found 
unconstitutional due to a stated public purpose that is “mere 
pretext” for enriching a private party.66 However, in applying 
Kelo, subsequent courts have experienced difficulty applying 
this restriction because “the Kelo majority did not define the 
term ‘mere pretext.’”67  
Justice Kennedy, in a concurrence that qualified his 
agreement with the majority in Kelo, took steps to outline a 
hypothetical taking that would be unconstitutional under the 
Public Use Clause for “mere pretext.”68 He defined as 
unconstitutional “transfers intended to confer benefits on 
particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or 
  
 58 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.  
 59 Id. 
 60 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004). 
 61 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475. 
 62 Id. at 489-90.  
 63 Id. at 483. 
 64 Id. at 478 (emphasis added). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 486-87. 
 67 Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 68 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
2012] A STANDARDLESS STANDARD 1225 
pretextual public benefits.”69 Though he agreed with Justice 
Stevens that generally courts should afford legislatures 
deference in their determinations to take land for public 
purposes, he noted that “[a] court confronted with a plausible 
accusation of impermissible favoritism to private parties 
should treat the objection as a serious one and review the 
record to see if it has merit.”70 While the majority opinion 
approached the stated public purpose with a “presumption of 
validity,” Justice Kennedy put forth a hypothetical where the 
risk of hidden impermissible favoritism in a transfer of taken 
land to private parties is so severe that courts should instead 
apply a presumption of constitutional invalidity.71 Such a case 
would exist where “the transfers are . . . suspicious, or the 
procedures employed . . . [are] prone to abuse, or the purported 
benefits [to the public] are . . . trivial or implausible . . . .”72 
Thus, Kennedy’s concurrence sets forth guidelines by which a 
successful claim of pretext for impermissible favoritism can be 
brought to prevent a taking that benefits a private party.73  
In joining the majority to uphold the taking in Kelo, 
Justice Kennedy identified several reasons why the taking at 
issue did not exhibit signs of impermissible favoritism.74 Among 
these factors were the City’s formulation of a development plan 
and commitment of public funds for the project before the 
private beneficiaries were identified.75 In addition, the City’s 
compliance with “elaborate procedural requirements that 
facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city’s 
purposes” led Kennedy to join the majority in upholding the 
taking as constitutional.76 Notably, such procedural safeguards 
included a seven-day trial before the superior court with regard 
to the public use challenge.77 As indicated in his concurrence, 
the absence of such factors would have prompted Justice 
Kennedy to apply a heightened level of scrutiny, which could 
have resulted in a finding that the taking was an 
unconstitutional violation of the Public Use Clause.78  
  
 69 Id. at 490. 
 70 Id. at 491. 
 71 Id. at 493. 
 72 Id.  
 73 Id.  
 74 Id. at 491-93. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 493. 
 77 Id. at 475 (majority opinion).  
 78 Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is essential to clarifying 
the Kelo decision with regard to “mere pretext” because, as the 
deciding vote on a split court, Kennedy explicitly conditioned his 
agreement with the majority on specific actions taken by the 
City’s planning process to convince him of the taking’s 
constitutionality.79 Though the concurrence expresses the opinion 
of only a single justice, it makes clear, in conjunction with the 
majority’s warning about pretextual takings,80 that courts must 
not apply an absolutely deferential standard when property 
owners raise legitimate and well-founded public use challenges.81 
Rather, “deference to the government’s public purpose 
determination may be overcome . . . if the party challenging the 
taking makes a ‘clear showing’ that the government’s stated 
public purpose is ‘irrational,’ with ‘only incidental or pretextual 
public benefits.’”82 Thus, courts should give close review to 
takings that clearly exhibit the possibility of unconstitutional 
transfers as described in Kennedy’s concurring opinion.83 As 
such, Kelo establishes a “federal baseline”84 under which courts 
must apply a heightened standard of review85 to challenges 
under the Public Use Clause that are supported by substantial 
evidence of impermissible favoritism.86  
Takings that benefit private parties while only creating 
incidental public benefits are unconstitutional under the Public 
Use Clause.87 Thus, where substantial evidence indicates that 
eminent domain is exercised with impermissible favoritism, 
courts must apply a heightened standard of review to prevent 
violations of the Fifth Amendment.88 By failing to apply this 
scrutiny in Kaur, the New York Court of Appeals did not meet 
its constitutional obligation to prevent a taking justified by 
merely pretextual benefits to the public.89 
  
 79 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State 
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010) (No. 10-402), 2010 WL 4232633, at *20 
[hereinafter Tuck-It-Away Cert. Petition].  
 80 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (majority opinion). 
 81 Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P’ship, 198 P.3d 615, 656 (Haw. 2008). 
 82 Id. (citations omitted). 
 83 See Tuck-It-Away Cert. Petition, supra note 79, at 20.  
 84 Cormack v. Settle-Beshears, 474 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 85 W. Seafood Co. v. United States, 202 F. App’x 670, 675 (5th Cir. 2006).  
 86 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 87 Id. at 490-93. 
 88 Id.  
 89 See infra Part V. 
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III. MISAPPLYING KELO—A SPLIT IN THE COURTS 
While courts uniformly apply Kelo to takings for which 
the stated purpose is economic development,90 jurisdictions 
differ as to whether the heightened standard for reviewing 
pretext claims should be used for other categories of takings, 
such as those purportedly executed to eliminate blight.91 Those 
courts that afford a deferential presumption of validity to 
takings where substantial evidence suggests the stated public 
purpose of blight remediation is mere pretext in order to 
bestow a private benefit operate against the dictates of Kelo.92 
The New York Court of Appeals suffered from this failing when 
it improperly upheld the taking in Kaur.93 
In cases where the legitimacy of a taking for economic 
development is challenged under the Public Use Clause due to 
evidence of favoritism, courts uniformly apply Kelo’s standard 
for reviewing pretext claims.94 For example, in Western Seafood 
Co. v. United States, the Fifth Circuit considered a public use 
challenge to a taking that sought to promote economic 
development through transfer of Western Seafood’s waterfront 
property to Hiram Walker Royall, a private developer.95 There, 
the court considered factual evidence of impermissible 
favoritism to determine whether the stated public purpose was 
merely a pretext for conferring a private benefit.96 This evidence 
supported allegations that the private developer had himself 
proposed the development project and that the City had granted 
him complete operational control over the project.97 However, the 
court upheld the taking as constitutional because the evidence 
“[did] not support the inference that the City exhibited 
favoritism or [had] a purpose other than to promote economic 
development.”98 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered 
all of the evidence presented by challengers to determine 
  
 90 See, e.g., Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Cano Martin Pena v. Fortuno, 604 
F.3d 7, 23 (1st Cir. 2010); W. Seafood Co., 202 F. App’x at 674. 
 91 Compare Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 n.10 (2d Cir. 2008), with 
Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 171-72 (D.C. 2007).  
 92 See supra Part II.  
 93 See infra Part V. 
 94 See, e.g., Fortuno, 604 F.3d at 23; W. Seafood Co., 202 F. App’x at 674. 
 95 W. Seafood Co., 202 F. App’x at 671. 
 96 Id. at 675. 
 97 Id. at 675 n.9. 
 98 Id. 
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whether a heightened standard of review was necessary and 
thus correctly applied the analysis required by Kelo.99  
On the other hand, a conflict exists between 
jurisdictions as to whether the heightened standard of review 
envisioned by Kelo for suspicious takings applies to cases 
where the stated public purpose is blight remediation rather 
than economic development.100 While the Second Circuit has 
expressly limited heightened scrutiny to economic development 
takings,101 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has correctly 
applied Kelo’s pretext analysis to a taking for blight 
remediation.102  
The Second Circuit failed to apply Kelo’s heightened 
standard of review to a blight remediation taking in 
Goldstein.103 There, ESDC took petitioner’s property with the 
intention of transferring it to Forest City Ratner Company 
(FCRC), a private developer, to develop a new sports stadium 
for the New Jersey Nets in the Atlantic Yards Project Area.104 A 
blight study commissioned by ESDC found that the 
neighborhood was characterized by “unsanitary and 
substandard conditions,” such as vacant and underutilized 
buildings, irregularly shaped lots, and a long-abandoned and 
deteriorating rail line.105 The challenging property owners, 
however, claimed the finding of blight was merely pretext for 
the private benefit to FCRC.106 The allegations of impermissible 
favoritism were supported by evidence that the private 
developer first conceived of the project and proposed the 
geographic boundaries thereof, that the blight study occurred 
after the project had been announced, and that the required 
public review was a “sham.”107 Regardless, the court rejected the 
public use challenge on its face, finding that the Kelo pretext 
analysis did not apply because “private economic development 
is neither the sole, nor the primary asserted justification” for 
  
 99 Id.; see also City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1137 (Ohio 2006) 
(applying Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo to a taking for economic development 
purposes to support the proposition that the court should “strike down a taking that, by 
a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or 
pretextual benefits”). 
 100 Compare Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008), with Franco v. 
Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 171-72 (D.C. 2007).  
 101 Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 64.  
 102 Franco, 930 A.2d at 171-72.  
 103 Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 64.  
 104 Id. at 53. 
 105 Id. at 59.  
 106 Id. at 52-53. 
 107 Id. at 55-56. 
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the taking.108 The court also refused to apply Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence, finding that, “Kennedy may well have intended 
[his opinion] to apply exclusively to cases where the sole ground 
asserted for the taking was economic development.”109  
Conversely, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals correctly 
applied Kelo in a public use challenge to a taking for blight 
remediation.110 In Franco v. National Capital Revitalization 
Corp., the court reversed the trial court’s decision to dismiss a 
claim for impermissible favoritism where a municipal agency 
took and transferred land to a private party for the purpose of 
developing a purportedly blighted area.111 There, the city alleged 
that the challenger’s shopping center was a blighting factor and 
thus subject to taking by eminent domain.112 The city based its 
finding on evidence that the area was “characterized by 
underused, neglected, and poorly maintained properties,” and 
that fragmented ownership encouraged an increase in crime, 
trash, and “other blighting factors.”113 Further, the city claimed 
development by the private recipient would result in crime 
reduction, increased sanitation, local job creation, expansion of 
the tax base for the city, and the general “revitalization of an 
economically distressed community.”114 On the other hand, the 
landowner made “specific factual allegations” in support of his 
pretext claim, including allegations that the municipal agency 
had entered into an agreement with the private developer two 
years before the development program was introduced to the 
city council, that the agency had “refused to discuss 
redevelopment plans with any present owners,” and that the 
site was not actually blighted.115 
The D.C. Circuit remanded the case for the court below 
to try the pretext claim on its merits, finding that “Kelo makes 
clear that there is room for a landowner to claim that the 
legislature’s declaration of a public purpose is a pretext 
  
 108 Id. at 64.  
 109 Id. at 64 n.10. Furthermore, as Part IV of this note will explain, the 
criteria necessary in New York to take property for either blight remediation or 
economic development are indistinguishable from one another. See infra Part IV. Thus, 
the distinction is an unsound basis upon which to alter the application of the Public 
Use Clause. See infra Part IV.  
 110 Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 171-72 (D.C. 2007).  
 111 Id. at 162-63. 
 112 Id. at 163. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 170-71.  
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designed to make a taking for private purposes.”116 Unlike the 
Second Circuit in Goldstein,117 other courts have correctly 
applied the heightened scrutiny required by Kelo.118 
Due to the devastating consequences of eminent domain 
abuse to vulnerable communities,119 courts should not apply a 
uniform standard of absolute deference when deciding whether 
the stated purpose of blight remediation is merely pretextual to 
bestowing a private benefit.120 The Second Circuit failed to 
apply heightened scrutiny in Goldstein and thus violated the 
Kelo standard.121 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals 
failed to even mention Kelo when it upheld a taking justified by 
blight remediation despite well-founded allegations of 
impermissible favoritism in Kaur.122 Thus, the court deferred to 
ESDC’s finding of blight and, in doing so, upheld a harmful and 
unconstitutional taking.  
IV. BLURRING THE LINE: THE EQUIVALENCE OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND BLIGHT REMEDIATION  
To justify a taking under the Public Use Clause, the 
factors for finding blight in New York are indistinguishable 
from those used to determine the need for economic 
development.123 Thus, the Second Circuit’s theory that takings 
for blight remediation require less judicial scrutiny than those 
justified by economic development was illogical.124 The New 
York Court of Appeals presumably followed Goldstein as 
precedent in Kaur when it improperly deferred to ESDC’s 
finding of blight in Manhattanville despite substantial evidence 
of impermissible favoritism.125 Therefore, the deferential 
standard applied by the court failed to meet the constitutional 
  
 116 Id. at 171-72.  
 117 Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 n.10 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 118 See Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Ltd. P’ship, 198 P.3d 615, 650 (Haw. 2008) 
(directing the trial court in a public use challenge of a taking allegedly accomplished to 
improve a public highway to “consider any and all evidence . . . indicating that the private 
benefit . . . predominated”); In re Condemnation Proceeding by the Redevelopment Auth. 
of Phila., 938 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. 2007) (considering a pretext claim pursuant to Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo against a taking for blight remediation, and finding that 
the record does not support a bad faith claim).  
 119 See supra Part I. 
 120 See supra Part II. 
 121 See supra Part III. 
 122 See infra Part V. 
 123 See generally Norman Siegel, Steven Hyman & Philip van Buren, The 
Trouble with Eminent Domain in New York, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 77 (2011).  
 124 Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 125 See infra Part V. 
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requirement of judicial review under the Public Use Clause as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Kelo.  
Courts considered blight removal to be a valid public 
purpose for condemnation long before the Supreme Court ruled 
that economic development was, additionally, a valid public 
purpose.126 The traditional definition of blight, however, was 
narrow: it was limited to “slums . . . whose eradication was itself 
found to constitute a public purpose for . . . condemnation” 
because they created conditions that threatened the health and 
welfare of the surrounding community.127 Today, New York’s 
criteria for condemnation due to blight include a wide array of 
factors, including a simple lack of economic development.128 The 
New York State Urban Development Corporation Act (UDC Act) 
prescribes that, for a finding of blight, the condemning authority 
must determine that “the area in which the project is to be 
located is a substandard or insanitary area, or is in danger of 
becoming a substandard or insanitary area and tends to impair 
or arrest the sound growth and development of the 
municipality.”129 Though “insanitary” is a historical criterion for 
blight, “substandard” describes a broad range of conditions that 
a legislature might find in any area it determines to be in need 
of economic development without finding traditional blighting 
factors.130 The New York Court of Appeals embraced this broad 
definition of blight in Yonkers Community Development Agency 
v. Morris, holding that, “areas eligible for . . . renewal are not 
limited to ‘slums’ as that term was formerly applied, and that, 
among other things, economic underdevelopment and 
stagnation are also threats to the public sufficient to make 
their removal cognizable as a public purpose.”131 This decision 
not only established economic development as a legitimate 
public purpose in New York; it also expanded the definition of 
blight to encompass the need for economic development. Thus, 
the line between economic development and blight remediation 
was blurred in New York well before Kelo established the 
federal baseline for economic development,132 and certainly 
before the Second Circuit limited the application of Kelo’s 
heightened standard of review to allegations of pretext 
  
 126 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
 127 Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 330 (N.Y. 1975). 
 128 Id. 
 129 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6260(c)(1) (McKinney 2000).  
 130 Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 330.  
 131 Id. (emphasis added). 
 132 Cormack v. Settle-Beshears, 474 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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concerning takings accomplished solely for economic 
development purposes.133 
The blurred distinction in New York between blight 
remediation and economic development is exemplified by the 
cases surrounding the use of eminent domain in Times Square 
during the mid 1980s.134 There, courts relied on factors such as 
underutilization and suboptimal tax revenues to justify the 
elimination of urban blight through eminent domain.135 In 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. New York, the 
Second Circuit upheld a determination of blight based on, 
among other factors, the underutilization of property, high 
vacancy rates, rundown storefronts, and the presence of 
pornographic businesses.136 These conditions, the court held, led 
to an “unproductive use of potentially valuable land,” and thus 
justified the use of eminent domain.137 In In re G. & A. Books, 
Inc., the findings of blight were clearly dependent on 
determinations that Times Square was less economically 
productive than it could have been with proper 
redevelopment.138 This is precisely the justification the City of 
New London provided in determining the need to exercise its 
power of eminent domain as described in Kelo.139 Thus, courts 
should apply the standard developed in Kelo to takings in New 
York that claim blight remediation as their public purpose.  
As in blight cases, underutilization has also been used 
to justify takings solely for economic development in New York, 
underscoring the convergence of the two public purposes.140 In 
Sunrise Properties v. Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency, the 
  
 133 Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 134 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. New York, 672 F.2d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 
1982); see also In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 135 Id.  
 136 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 672 F.2d at 294. 
 137 Id.; see also In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d at 292 (“Only 4,000 people, 
an extraordinarily low figure for a five-block area located adjacent to one of the world’s 
most densely developed business districts, work in the area. As a result of an absence 
of development for more than half a century, the existing buildings are old and run 
down; most are substandard for their intended commercial uses and many are vacant 
above the first floor. While the area is zoned for the highest density allowed in the City, 
16% of the land area is used only for parking, 72% of the development rights have not 
been used, and 18% of the developed parts is vacant. The tax yield from the Project 
area is commensurately low: the FEIS estimated that while the existing properties in 
the Project area were expected to pay approximately $5.4 million in taxes in 1984-85, a 
single building a block away was expected to pay $6.2 million in taxes.”). 
 138 See In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d at 292.  
 139 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005). 
 140 Sunrise Props., Inc. v. Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency, 614 N.Y.S.2d 
841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).  
2012] A STANDARDLESS STANDARD 1233 
taking of private land was authorized for job creation, 
infrastructure development, and general economic improvement 
of the project area.141 In upholding the taking as constitutional, 
the court stated, “The finding . . . that the property is 
underutilized is equivalent to a determination that 
condemnation of the property and subsequent development will 
serve a public purpose.”142 Thus, underutilization was used to 
justify a taking for economic development just as it was used to 
justify takings for blight remediation in Times Square.143  
Furthermore, just as creating jobs and increasing tax 
revenue were used to justify blight remediation in Times 
Square these exact factors are the basis for takings in New 
York aimed at promoting economic development. In In re 
Fisher, New York City took land in Lower Manhattan for a 
private transfer to the New York Stock Exchange without a 
finding of blight.144 There, the court upheld the city’s actions 
because it found that the taking would spur economic 
development through increased job opportunities and tax 
revenues.145 Clearly, the line between blight remediation and 
economic development in New York is blurred beyond any 
substantial distinction. Therefore, challenges to a taking under 
the Public Use Clause in New York should receive the same 
standard of review regardless of whether the taking is justified 
as a means to create economic development or to eliminate 
conditions that cause blight.  
Though Kelo requires an inquiry into takings where the 
stated public purpose is mere pretext for bestowing a private 
benefit,146 New York courts apply an absolutely deferential 
standard to a legislative or administrative decision to take land 
for blight remediation:  
It is only where there is no room for reasonable difference of opinion 
as to whether an area is blighted, that judges may substitute their 
views as to the adequacy with which the public purpose of blight 
removal has been made out for those of the legislatively designated 
agencies; where . . . “those bodies have made their finding, not 
corruptly or irrationally or baselessly, there is nothing for the courts 
  
 141 Id.  
 142 Id. (emphasis added).  
 143 See In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d at 292. 
 144 See In re Fisher, 730 N.Y.S.2d 516, 516-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). 
 145 Id. at 517. 
 146 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005).  
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to do about it, unless every act and decision of other departments of 
government is subject to revision by the courts.”147  
This deferential treatment is not appropriate for cases in 
which challengers allege impermissible favoritism in violation of 
the Public Use Clause and support such allegations with 
substantial evidence.148 Thus, the standard applied by New York 
courts is below the federal baseline established in Kelo and 
enables legislatures to abuse their power of eminent domain.149  
New York is one of only eleven states that permit 
takings for solely economic development purposes.150 Thus, a 
  
 147 In re Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. 
2009) (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1953)). 
 148 See supra Part II. 
 149 See supra Part II. 
 150 The following research was conducted by Justin Kamen, Whitney Philips, 
and Ellie Merle, under the direction of Norman Siegel, Esq., from June-August, 2010. 
The following eleven states allow eminent domain takings for the sole purpose of 
economic development: 
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-168-304, 14-169-802(a)(1)(A) (2010). Hawaii: HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 101-2 (2010). Illinois: 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/5-5-5(c), 620/9 (2011); see 
Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 167 (Ill. 2003); Sw. Ill. Dev. 
Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 13-14 (Ill. 2002). Kansas: KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 26-501b (2009). Maryland: See Mayor of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 
324, 353 (Md. 2007). Massachusetts: See Commonwealth v. Bos. Edison Co., 828 N.E.2d 
16, 30 (Mass. 2005). Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-27-1 (2010); see Phil West, 
Mississippi Senate Upholds Barbour Veto of Eminent Domain Bill, COM. APPEAL (Mar. 
26, 2009, 1:54 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2009/mar/26/mississippi-
senate-upholds-barbour-veto-eminent-do/. New York: See In re Glen Cove Cmty. Dev. 
Agency, 712 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Sunrise Props. v. Jamestown 
Urban Renewal Agency, 614 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). Rhode Island: 
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-64.12-8 (2011). South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-8-50 
(2010). Utah: See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-2(e)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011).  
  The following thirty-nine states do not allow eminent domain takings for 
the sole purpose of economic development:  
Alabama: See ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2 (2010). Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.240(d) (2010). 
Arizona: A.Z. CONST. art. II, § 17; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 12-1111 (2010). 
California: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030 (West 2010); Redevelopment Agency 
of S.F. v. Hayes, 206 P.2d 105, 121 (Ca. Ct. Apps. 1954). Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 38-1-101(b)(I) (2010). Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-127a(1) (2010). Delaware: 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 9501A(a) (2010); Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land With 
Improvements, 1986 De. Super. LEXIS 1348 (Del. Sup. Ct. Aug. 11, 1986). Florida: 
FLA. STAT. § 73.014 (2010). Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(9)(B) (2011). Idaho: IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 7-701A(2)(b) (2010). Indiana: IND. CODE §§ 32-24-4.5-1(a), 36-7-14-20, 36-
7-14-43(7) (2010); Hawkins v. Greenfield, 230 N.E.2d 396, 403 (Ind. 1967). Iowa: IOWA 
CODE § 6A.22(2) (2010). Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (West 2010). 
Louisiana: L.A. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(3). Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 816 (2010). 
Michigan: M.I. CONST. art. X § 2 (2010). Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 117.025(11)(b) 
(2010). Missouri: MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.271 (West 2010). Montana: See MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 70-30-102 (2010). Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-710.04(1) (2010). Nevada: See 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.010 (2010). New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498-
A:2(VII)(b) (2010). New Jersey: See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § III, ¶ 1; Gallenthin Realty 
Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 449 (N.J. 2007). New Mexico: N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 3-60A-10(L)(3) (2010). North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-512(6) 
(2010). North Dakota: N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16. Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
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condemning authority can claim blight remediation, rather than 
economic development, as its purpose for taking property so as 
to avoid close judicial review of its motives.151 In states that do 
not permit eminent domain solely for economic development 
purposes, courts review evidence to ensure that condemnors do 
not manufacture blight findings in attempts to conceal a true 
purpose of strictly economic development.152 For example, in City 
of Norwood v. Horney, the Supreme Court of Ohio struck down 
the use of eminent domain where the condemning authority 
sought to take property in what it deemed to be a “deteriorating 
area.”153 There, the court found the taking illegal because the 
factors used to determine whether an area was deteriorating, 
including increased traffic, numerous curb cuts, and small front 
yards, created “a standardless standard,” by which a 
condemning agency could describe practically any city.154 
Therefore, the taking was founded solely on the promotion of 
economic development and, thus, did not have a sufficient public 
purpose under the Ohio Constitution.155 However, in New York, 
no such scrutiny is applied to blight takings because economic 
development is a sufficient public purpose in and of itself for the 
use of eminent domain.156 Also, the criteria used in New York to 
justify takings for both blight elimination and for economic 
development are nearly identical, rendering the line between 
these two public purposes blurred beyond substantive 
recognition.157 Thus, it is vitally important that New York courts 
apply the federal baseline established in Kelo to blight-
remediating takings.158 Otherwise, legislatures can circumvent 
  
§ 163.01(H)(1) (LexisNexis 2011). Oklahoma: Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 
639, 647 (Okla. 2006). Oregon: See OR. REV. STAT. § 35.015 (2009). Pennsylvania: See 
26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 204 (2010). South Carolina: S.C. CONST. ANN. art. I, § 13. 
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (West 2010). Texas: TX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 2206.001 (b)(3) (West 2010). Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1040(a) (2010); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3201(17)-(19) (2010). Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 1-219.1 (2010). 
Washington: See WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 35.81.080 (West 2010). West Virginia: See 
W. VA. CODE § 54-1-2 (2010). Wisconsin: See WIS. STAT. § 32.03(6)(c) (2010). Wyoming: 
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-26-801(c) (2010). 
 151 See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 152 See, e.g., City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1123 (Ohio 2006). 
 153 Id. at 1145. 
 154 Id. at 1144-45. 
 155 Id. at 1142. 
 156 See In re Glen Cove Cmty. Dev. Agency, 712 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1999); Sunrise Props., Inc. v. Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency, 614 N.Y.S.2d 
841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).  
 157 Compare Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 726 (N.Y.), 
cert. denied, Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010), 
with Sunrise Props., Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d at 842. 
 158 See supra Part II. 
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Kelo’s ban on takings for impermissible private purposes by 
claiming a purpose of blight remediation rather than economic 
development, as was the case in Kaur.159 
With the Second Circuit’s refusal to extend Kelo’s 
pretext analysis to takings for blight remediation in 
Goldstein,160 condemning authorities in New York can avoid a 
heightened standard of review for takings that exhibit evidence 
of impermissible favoritism161 by simply claiming blight 
remediation as the purpose for a taking rather than economic 
development. Thus, such an authority can bypass judicial 
scrutiny and bestow a private benefit through eminent domain 
by simply manufacturing a blight study.162 This was the case in 
Kaur, where the finding of blight in Manhattanville was 
supported by the desire to create jobs, increase tax revenue,163 
and prevent underutilization of property.164 In this way, the 
public purpose of blight remediation stated in Kaur is very 
similar to the public purpose of economic development used 
elsewhere in the State.165 As such, judicial review of purpose in 
eminent domain takings should be equivalent in these 
instances. Because the New York Court of Appeals applied a 
deferential standard in Kaur and declined to apply the 
heightened scrutiny demanded by Kelo,166 the Supreme Court 
should have remanded the case back to the New York Court of 
Appeals for argument on the merits as to the claims of 
impermissible favoritism.167 Instead, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari and tacitly condoned the erroneous deference applied 
by the New York Court of Appeals to ESDC’s exercise of 
eminent domain for the sole benefit of Columbia University.168 
V. KAUR V. NEW YORK STATE URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION: AN UNCHECKED ABUSE OF POWER 
In Kaur, the New York Court of Appeals declined to 
address the mere pretext analysis demanded by Kelo despite 
  
 159 See Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 724. 
 160 Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 64 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 161 See supra Part II. 
 162 See supra Part II. 
 163 Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 729. 
 164 Id. at 726. 
 165 In re Fisher, 730 N.Y.S.2d 516, 516-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Sunrise Props., 
Inc. v. Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency, 614 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).  
 166 See supra Part II. 
 167 See infra Part V. 
 168 Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822, 822-23 (2010).  
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well-founded allegations that the taking was motivated by a 
private purpose.169 There, ESDC purportedly sought to 
remediate blight in Manhattanville, a neighborhood on the 
Upper West Side of Manhattan, by transferring property to 
Columbia University.170 Because the challengers in Kaur 
presented a “plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism 
to private parties,”171 the court should have applied heightened 
scrutiny rather than the standard deference afforded to 
legislatures in typical public use challenges. Moreover, the 
evidence of impermissible favoritism in Kaur was nearly 
identical to the hypothetical factors outlined in Justice 
Kennedy’s Kelo concurrence, which would be subject to 
heightened scrutiny.172 Finally, the procedures in New York for 
effecting a condemnation of property are particularly prone to 
abuse and thus challenges to such takings should receive 
proper consideration by the judiciary.173 Thus, the New York 
Court of Appeals should have applied a heightened standard of 
review in Kaur due to evidence strongly suggesting that the 
taking, purportedly justified by blight remediation, was 
actually intended to bestow a purely private benefit.174 Because 
the courts have failed to prevent eminent domain abuse in New 
York, the legislature should take steps to reduce the instances 
and inequalities of takings that have private beneficiaries.  
A. Evidence of Impermissible Favoritism in Kaur 
The facts of Kaur were strikingly similar to those described 
as highly suspect by Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical example of an 
impermissible taking in his Kelo concurrence, and thus the case 
demanded heightened judicial scrutiny.175 Unlike in Kelo, where 
the private beneficiary was unknown at the time the 
redevelopment plan originated,176 Columbia’s attorneys, 
consultants, and architects drafted every document concerning the 
Manhattanville redevelopment plan.177 Additionally, numerous 
actions taken by both ESDC and Columbia throughout the 
  
 169 See Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 732.  
 170 In re Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2009), rev’d 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010). 
 171 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 172 Id. at 493.  
 173 See infra Part V.B.  
 174 See In re Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 28. 
 175 See supra Part II.  
 176 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 177 In re Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 20. 
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condemnation process suggest the kind of conspiratorial 
relationship envisioned by the Supreme Court in Kelo to constitute 
impermissible favoritism.178 Such evidence includes Columbia’s 
misdeeds as the dominant property owner in Manhattanville,179 
ESDC’s reliance on blight studies performed by Columbia’s 
advisor,180 and ESDC’s attempts to obfuscate the record by 
withholding important documents during the litigation process.181 
Perhaps the most striking evidence of eminent domain 
abuse in Kaur was Columbia’s own role in creating the factors 
that ultimately led to ESDC’s determination of blight in the 
area, such as underutilization of property and the existence of 
building code violations.182 When ESDC considered developing 
the area in 2002, its Master Plan described no blight or 
blighted conditions in Manhattanville.183 No blight studies were 
conducted thereafter until 2006, when Columbia had already 
taken control of “the very properties that would form the basis 
for a subsequent blight study.”184 As owner of these properties, 
Columbia vacated much of the real estate by forcing more than 
50 percent of the tenants out of seventeen buildings.185 
Additionally, Columbia facilitated the degeneration of the 
neighborhood by failing to address water infiltration and 
building code violations, allowing tenants to violate local codes 
and ordinances, and maintaining garbage and debris in its 
properties for several years.186 Further, the Appellate Division 
found that Manhattanville “was not in a depressed economic 
condition when . . . ESDC embarked on their Columbia-
prepared-and-financed quest.”187 As such, the taking in Kaur 
provided substantial evidence of impermissible favoritism. 
Columbia’s creation of blighting factors distinguishes 
Kaur from Western Seafood, where a private developer received 
taken land in an economically stagnant community to spur 
development.188 In that case, the Fifth Circuit applied Kelo’s test 
for mere pretext because the private developer had a suspicious 
  
 178 Id. at 21.  
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 12-13.  
 181 Id. at 29 (Richter, J., concurring). 
 182 Id. at 21. 
 183 Id. at 19. 
 184 Id. at 21. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 19. 
 188 W. Seafood Co. v. United States, 202 F. App’x 670, 675 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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amount of control over the project.189 However, the court 
allowed the taking: “because the [private developer] own[ed] 
acres of property along the river where the marina [was] to be 
built, the City’s interest in their collaboration [was] logical.”190 
While this situation is similar to the facts of Kaur, Western 
Seafood shows no evidence that the private developer caused 
the very blighting factors that supplied the need for a taking.191 
In Kaur, on the other hand, the city rewarded Columbia for 
causing blight by giving the irresponsible property owner even 
more land.192 Therefore, heightened scrutiny was appropriate in 
Kaur but not in Western Seafood. 
ESDC’s complicity with Columbia’s efforts to justify the 
use of eminent domain in Manhattanville provides further 
evidence of impermissible favoritism.193 In 2006, ESDC hired 
private consultant Allee King Rosen and Flemming, Inc. 
(AKRF) to conduct a blight study of Manhattanville.194AKRF’s 
finding of blight was tainted, however, by its previous role in 
assisting Columbia to develop and execute an expansion plan 
in 2004.195 When the challenging property owners issued a 
Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request for documents 
concerning the relationship between AKRF, ESDC, and 
Columbia, the court forced ESDC to disclose the documents 
because “the difficulty of offering perfectly objective advice 
while serving two masters elevate[d the] FOIL appeal beyond 
the average agency-consultant relationship that the FOIL 
exemptions are designed to foster and protect.”196 By employing 
Columbia’s consultant for its initial blight study, ESDC clearly 
favored Columbia in the process of determining the need for 
exercising eminent domain in Manhattanville.197 Though ESDC 
subsequently replaced AKRF with Earth Tech, a consultant 
without suspicious ties to Columbia, ESDC requested that 
Earth Tech “‘replicate’ the AKRF study using the same flawed 
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 190 Id. 
 191 See id. 
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methodology” previously employed by AKRF.198 Thus, ESDC’s 
final blight study was just as tarnished by favoritism to 
Columbia as the original AKRF study had been.199 Additionally, 
Earth Tech’s study was not completed until 2008, at which 
point “the ESDC/Columbia steamroller had virtually run its 
course to the fullest.”200 This is exactly the kind of public-private 
conspiracy Justice Kennedy envisioned in Kelo to demand 
heightened scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.201 
One of the documents unveiled by the aforementioned 
FOIL litigation reveals the dramatic extent of ESDC’s role in 
creating a pretextual justification for the exercise of eminent 
domain on Columbia’s behalf.202 In an e-mail sent before hiring 
AKRF in 2006, ESDC Senior Counsel Joseph Petillo questioned 
the wisdom of conducting a blight study: “I am uncomfortable 
with [ESDC] shining a spotlight on the process used to 
manufacture support for condemnation . . . . [M]aybe we want 
to craft the support for our blight findings in a less public 
way . . . .”203 This e-mail was clearly evidence of unconstitutional 
collusion, as ESDC intended to “manufacture” support for the 
taking to benefit Columbia. Furthermore, ESDC not only 
withheld this and similar documents from challenging property 
owners despite numerous FOIL requests and litigations, but it 
also refused to keep the record open until the FOIL litigation 
initiated by the landowners was completed.204 As such, ESDC 
exhibited impermissible favoritism toward Columbia from the 
planning phase through the entire litigation process.205  
The Appellate Division, which first heard Kaur, 
concluded from this evidence that ESDC used its blight finding 
as pretext to bestowing a benefit on Columbia and, as per the 
Supreme Court’s instructions in Kelo, held that ESDC did not 
take the private property for a legitimate public purpose.206 
When the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate 
Division’s decision, the court failed to even mention Kelo, let 
alone apply Kennedy’s test for heightened scrutiny.207 Thus, the 
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Court of Appeals misapplied the Kelo standard where it was 
clearly applicable and therefore decided Kaur incorrectly.  
While the Second Circuit and the New York Court of 
Appeals also declined to apply a heightened standard of review 
in the Goldstein cases,208 the facts of the Atlantic Yards taking 
were more closely aligned with the facts of Kelo than with 
Kennedy’s hypothetical, and thus, unlike in Kaur, the courts 
were justified when they dismissed the public use challenges.209 
When ESDC decided to improve the Atlantic Yards Project 
Area through private development by the FCRC, the finding of 
blight was supported by over forty years of previous studies 
that had reached similar conclusions.210 Particularly, the blight 
studies determined the need to eliminate a large abandoned 
railway that was the main factor in the area’s economic 
deterioration.211 This supported ESDC’s decision to condemn 
property for transfer to FCRC on the basis that the area was, 
in fact, blighted.212 As blight remediation is a legitimate public 
purpose for the exercise of eminent domain, the courts were 
correct to uphold the taking of land in Atlantic Yards despite 
their failure to properly apply Kelo.213 Such evidence was not 
present in Kaur, however,214 and thus that case was erroneously 
decided under an overly deferential standard of review. 
B. Procedural Impediments to Public Use Challenges in 
New York 
The New York Court of Appeals should have applied 
heightened scrutiny in Kaur not only because factual evidence 
strongly suggested impermissible favoritism, but also because, 
under New York law, the challengers were unable to seek 
review at a trial level court.215 Instead, they were required to 
begin the litigation process at the appellate level after 
establishing the record at a public hearing conducted by 
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ESDC.216 In Kelo, Justice Kennedy’s call for heightened scrutiny 
in some public use challenges included cases where “the 
procedures employed [are] prone to abuse . . . .”217 Kennedy 
found a seven-day bench trial before the Superior Court to be 
an adequate procedural safeguard because property owners 
could challenge the legitimacy of the taking in a fair, 
adversarial proceeding.218 On the other hand, New York is 
currently the only state in which challenges to the legitimacy of 
an alleged public purpose for the exercise of eminent domain do 
not receive judicial review at the trial court level.219 Thus, the 
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New York Court of Appeals should have applied more exacting 
scrutiny in Kaur due to suboptimal procedural protections 
against the exercise of eminent domain for an illegitimate 
private purpose.220 
Under New York’s Eminent Domain Procedural Law 
(EDPL), a condemning authority is required to make a 
“determination and findings concerning the proposed public 
project,” in which it must specify “the public use, benefit or 
purpose to be served by the proposed public project.”221 Prior to 
its decision to take property, the condemnor must hold a public 
hearing222 where “any person . . . shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to present [a] . . . statement . . . concerning the 
proposed public project. A record of the hearing shall be 
kept . . . .”223 Any party wishing to challenge a decision to 
condemn property “may seek judicial review thereof by the 
appellate division of the supreme court . . . . The court shall 
either confirm or reject the condemnor’s determination and 
findings. The scope of review shall be limited to whether . . . a 
public use, benefit or purpose will be served by the proposed 
acquisition.”224 In Jackson v. New York State Urban 
Development Corp., the New York Court of Appeals found that 
the EDPL does not “[require] a trial-type hearing to challenge a 
tentative decision to condemn.”225 Therefore, a property owner 
who wishes to challenge the legitimacy of a taking under the 
Public Use Clause does not have the opportunity to present 
evidence to a neutral decision maker in a trial court for 
preservation of a record.226 Rather, such property owner must 
first present evidence at a public hearing conducted by the 
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condemning authority.227 The record that would normally be 
established in a trial court before a judge228 is thus developed 
under the guidance of the agency seeking to exercise eminent 
domain. When the property owner challenges the agency’s 
decision to condemn, the appellate court hears evidence 
developed at such hearing.229 This system creates procedural 
impediments to challenge the stated public purpose for a 
taking and is thus prone to abuse by condemning authorities.230  
The procedures outlined in the EDPL have been upheld 
as constitutional in New York and thus do not, on their own, 
violate a challenger’s due process rights under the Fifth 
Amendment.231 The Fifth Amendment mandates that the 
government shall not deprive citizens of property without due 
process,232 the adequacy of which is determined by considering 
the private interest at risk of deprivation by the procedure, the 
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the 
government’s interest in implementing the procedure.233 The 
Second Circuit ruled in Brody v. Village of Port Chester that 
the challenger of a taking “has no constitutional right to 
participate in the [agency’s] initial decision to exercise its 
power of eminent domain, and the post determination review 
procedure set forth in EDPL § 207 is sufficient” to provide 
challengers adequate process.234 Because challengers can raise 
their claims at the public hearing required under the EDPL, 
they have an opportunity to make a record by presenting their 
views and submitting evidence.235 As such, the procedure here 
described is not itself a violation of the due process right “to be 
heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”236 
However, Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical in Kelo does not 
require a violation of due process to trigger heightened scrutiny 
when there are allegations that the stated public purpose for a 
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taking is mere pretext to bestow a private benefit.237 Rather, his 
standards for denying a presumption of validity require only that 
“the procedures employed [are] prone to abuse . . . .”238 Though a 
public hearing allows challengers to establish a record that can 
later be heard by an appellate court, there are “practical 
impediments” inherent in this non-adversarial forum to 
demonstrating impermissible favoritism.239 For example, in Kaur, 
ESDC closed the record despite the fact that the challenging 
landowners were engaged in FOIL litigation to retrieve 
documents from ESDC in support of their public use challenge.240 
Had the record been established under the supervision of a 
neutral arbiter rather than by the condemning authority itself, 
the plaintiffs in Kaur may have been able to use these documents 
to state a more compelling case of impermissible favoritism.241 
Although the EDPL does not facially violate the Due Process 
Clause, it sufficiently burdens challengers to trigger heightened 
judicial review under Kennedy’s analysis for mere pretext.242 
Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals should have applied a 
heightened standard of review in Kaur.  
C. Possible Legislative Solutions to Eminent Domain in 
New York 
If the New York courts continue to allow takings for 
unconstitutional private purposes, then the New York State 
Legislature must take steps to prevent the abuses that occurred 
in Kaur from recurring in the future. Most obviously, New York 
should join the other forty-nine states in requiring trial level 
review of eminent domain challenges under the Public Use 
Clause243 to ensure procedures that are not “prone to abuse.”244 Also, 
if the courts insist on maintaining different standards of review, 
the application of which depend on whether a taking is intended to 
eliminate blight or solely to promote economic development,245 then 
the statutory scheme must redefine blight so as to avoid the 
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manipulations devised by ESDC and Columbia to elude 
heightened judicial scrutiny.246 Thus, New York should amend the 
UDC Act to construe “blighted area” narrowly. Specifically, the 
legislature should adopt Vermont’s statutory limitation that “[n]o 
area shall be determined to be a blighted area solely or primarily 
because its condition and value for tax purposes are less than the 
condition and value projected as the result of the implementation 
of any . . . private redevelopment plan.”247 Finally, New York 
should reduce the hardships imposed on persons displaced and 
disinherited by takings that seek solely to promote economic 
development by providing increased compensation for the 
property taken.248 The legislature should adopt Kansas’s approach, 
which requires the condemnor in an economic development taking 
to pay the landowner 150 percent of the subject property’s fair 
market value.249 By adopting these new laws, the New York State 
Legislature can reduce the instances and inequalities of eminent 
domain abuse despite the courts’ unwillingness to oppose private 
development interests and their political enablers.  
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should have reversed the New York 
Court of Appeals in Kaur and remanded the case for review 
using the heightened scrutiny required by Kelo. Such a decision 
would have both defended the vulnerable populations harmed 
by the taking itself250 and settled the jurisdictional split 
regarding public use challenges to takings that are purportedly 
intended to remediate blight.251 Instead, the Second Circuit and 
New York courts will continue to defer to the judgments of 
condemning authorities that seek to abuse their power of 
eminent domain and who, in doing so, contribute to the 
widening gap between rich and poor throughout the state.252  
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The Supreme Court may have denied certiorari in Kaur253 
because the New York Court of Appeals held that, besides 
eliminating blight, the expansion of Columbia University’s 
campus in Manhattanville would serve a public purpose in and of 
itself as a “civic project.”254 Under the UDC Act, ESDC is 
empowered to take land, not only to remediate blight,255 but also to 
“undertake the acquisition . . . of a [civic] project [when] . . . there 
exists . . . a need for the educational . . . facility . . . [and that] the 
project shall consist of . . . facilities which are suitable for 
educational . . . purposes.”256 Thus, the Supreme Court may have 
declined to discuss the suspicious facts surrounding ESDC’s 
finding of blight in Kaur due to an unwillingness to prevent the 
use of eminent domain in support of an important and beneficial 
educational institution.257 If so, the Court should take the next 
available opportunity to address the improper judicial deference 
expressed in Goldstein and displayed in Kaur in order to prevent 
the New York courts from further abdicating their duties as 
defenders of individual rights against the excesses of 
governmental power.258 However, if the New York courts 
continue to sanction eminent domain abuse despite the dictates 
of Kelo, the legislature must take action to protect vulnerable 
populations from takings that only benefit private parties.  
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